Dead End: Baan
Abstract
Baan was the Dutch software company that took the Boeing account from SAP in 1994 and, for about four years, looked like the only European rival SAP had. It came from Barneveld, a country town known for its egg auctions, where its engineers did not work on Sundays. Sales grew sixfold between 1994 and 1997. In April 1998 the company admitted that $43 million of licence revenue had been booked on software passed to a distributor owned by its own founders. The share price went from $54 to $11 in six months, the company lost money for seven quarters in a row, and in the summer of 2000 it was sold to the British engineering group Invensys for about $700 million. Investors who bought at the peak lost 95%.
Barneveld
Jan Baan, born in Rijssen in 1946, the eldest son in a family of ten, was an accountant who saw that a factory’s planning could be done by software. He started a consulting firm in Barneveld in 1978; his younger brother Paul later ran operations. BusinessWeek described the town as a place of 48,000 people “known for its chicken farms, egg auctions, and the brothers Baan.”
The brothers belonged to the conservative Dutch Reformed Church and so did most of the early engineers. The labs were free of swearing, women were expected to wear long skirts, and the company shut on Sundays even when customers were clamouring for help. On the other six days the programmers were given unusual freedom. Jan sketched what he wanted and the engineers improvised, sometimes adding functions nobody had asked for. Programmers loved the place. Management rarely knew what it would get, or when.
The product was enterprise resource planning software for manufacturers, the category whose history is told in From MRP to ERP: Software for the Factory. SAP of Germany was ahead: it had gone public in 1988 and had the large German industrial firms as customers. Baan lacked the money to catch up until 1993, when the American venture firm General Atlantic Partners invested $21 million. It was one of the first European technology companies backed by US venture capital.
Boeing
In 1994 Boeing was choosing software to tie together its manufacturing, and the finalists were SAP, Oracle, and Baan. None of them had yet produced distributed software of the kind Boeing wanted. Jan Baan had his consultants build a simulation of how it would look.
“We were working like hell,” a former manager told BusinessWeek. “But it wasn’t ready when he went in for the meeting. We were praying, ‘Please work, please work.’” The demonstration ran without a fault. Baan offered the system for less than $25 million, a discount of half, and won.
The contract made the company’s name. Baan listed its shares in Amsterdam and on Nasdaq in 1995, in a market for enterprise software that was growing 40% a year, and grew at 60% to 90% itself. Hasso Plattner, SAP’s co-chairman, was dismissive: “Baan was above all a P.R. challenge.”
The Two Baans
Before the flotation the brothers arranged their fortune. Their 39% of Baan Company went into a private holding company, Baan Investments, later renamed Vanenburg, and that company was placed under a charitable foundation, Oikonomos. Paul Baan left the software company to run the private side and the charities, which built orphanages in Indonesia among other things. Jan told reporters that it was easier to make money than to give it away.
The private company invested in technology start-ups with money borrowed from Dutch banks against its Baan shares. The brothers also set up a private reseller, Baan Business Systems, which became the largest distributor of Baan’s software. The public company therefore sold a good part of its product to a firm owned by its own largest shareholders, and those shareholders’ loans depended on its share price.
Sales strategy followed from the belief that a customer who had installed one system would not leave. New accounts were what counted. “I don’t think we were ever told directly to f— the customer, but that was the message,” a former account manager said.
To get ahead of SAP in software for sales forces and supply chains, Jan Baan hired Tom Tinsley, an 18-year veteran of McKinsey, as president, and over two years the company used its highly valued shares to buy nine firms, among them Aurum Software of San Francisco. The pieces were never joined. Each unit kept its own administration and its own salespeople, who met each other in the same customers’ offices. Baan paid $86.6 million in 1998 for Coda, a maker of financial software; the engineers in Barneveld, who preferred their own finance module, found other work to do when told to integrate it, and Coda was sold early in 2000 for $50 million.
April 1998
Under pressure to keep reported growth high, Baan transferred $43 million of software licences to the brothers’ distribution company and booked them as sales. That ran afoul of US accounting rules. In April 1998 the company had to defer the $43 million, and first-quarter net income fell to $2 million from $13 million.
The shares had peaked at $54 that month. The fund manager Putnam had sold its 9.3% stake late in 1997, citing the complicated corporate structure, and General Atlantic had been selling since 1996. Now American analysts downgraded the stock, and as it fell the Dutch banks holding Vanenburg’s Baan shares as collateral sold them, which pushed it down further. By October it stood at $11. Customers including Siemens and Carrier removed Baan’s software and installed SAP’s.
Jan Baan resigned in the summer of 1998. He renamed the private company to reduce the confusion and kept selling: during 1999 Vanenburg’s holding fell below 10% of Baan, a threshold Dutch law required it to report, which it did not do. Shareholders in the United States filed class actions from October 1998 alleging that insiders had sold while knowing what was coming. Baan’s officials denied it.
Seven Quarters
Two Americans, Tinsley and the former Aurum chief Mary Coleman, tried to rescue the company from a new headquarters in Virginia. The market turned against them. Companies had rushed to install new enterprise systems before the year 2000 date change, and most had bought by the third quarter of 1998. Orders then dried up across the industry.
Tinsley left in May 1999. Coleman, who had tried to present Baan as an internet company, quit in the first days of January 2000, as the company announced a fourth-quarter loss of $236 million, and the chief financial officer followed a week later. Revenue for 1999 was first reported as $635 million and then restated to $619 million, against $736 million in 1998; licence sales fell from $336 million to $193 million, and the restated loss for the year was $309.6 million. By mid-2000 the company had lost money for seven consecutive quarters and its equity was almost gone.
A caretaker chief executive, Pierre Everaert, looked for a buyer. Invensys offered €2.85 a share, about $709 million, and by 1 August 2000 had taken control of what remained, including 4,300 employees, of whom its chief executive Allen Yurko intended to cut 1,000 at once. Boeing, once the sale was certain, ordered the next version.
Invensys sold Baan to SSA Global in 2003 for $135 million. The software is now part of Infor.
Dead End: Growth on Related-Party Sales
The $43 million was small beside annual revenue of about $700 million. It mattered because of who the buyer was. Investors had accepted a structure in which the founders owned the main distributor, on the understanding that the public company’s accounts were clean. Once one quarter showed otherwise, every earlier quarter was in doubt, and a company selling systems that customers expected to run for many years could not afford doubt about its own survival.
The brothers came out differently from their shareholders. BusinessWeek reckoned that buyers at the peak had lost 95%, more than $10 billion in market value, while Jan and Paul Baan had put more than $150 million of their proceeds into a portfolio of internet companies. In 2001 Jan Baan started another software firm, Cordys.
📚 Sources
- Baker, Stephen, with Spiro, Menno and Hamm, Steve: “The Fall of Baan” — BusinessWeek, international edition, August 2000 (Barneveld, the church, General Atlantic, the Boeing demonstration, the holding structure, the acquisitions, the $43 million, the share price, the departures, Invensys)
- “Baan in Dutch” — CFO Magazine, 2000 (the deferral of $43 million in the first quarter of 1998, net income of $2 million against $13 million, Baan Business Systems, the peak of $54, the Year 2000 buying pattern, the departures of Coleman and Mooney, the $236 million fourth-quarter loss, the class action after the profit warning of 12 October 1998)
- “Baan’s future in more doubt after 1999 loss widens” — Computerworld, 2000 (restated 1999 revenue of $619 million and loss of $309.6 million, 1998 revenue of $736 million, licence sales, the $709 million offer, seven straight quarters of losses)
- Invensys tender offer for Baan Company N.V., Schedule TO, June 2000 — US Securities and Exchange Commission (€2.85 per share)
- Baan Corporation — Wikipedia (the sale to SSA Global in 2003 for $135 million, Infor)
- SAP: “The SAP R/2 era: 1981–1990” (listing in 1988)
- Jan Baan — Wikipedia (birth in Rijssen in 1946, eldest son of ten children, Cordys in 2001)
- Image: Jan baan-1454508579.png by Vincent Everts (CC BY-SA 4.0), via Wikimedia Commons